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Behind the Scenes of Al-Qa`ida’s Media Strategy
Abstract
Jihadi terrorist organizations view their media opportunities as weapons in their war
against the West. While there is a considerable body of work discussing the content and
form of Al-Qa'ida's media, including both their written press and video products, we have
significantly less information on what goes on behind the scenes: how the tactical elements
and strategic goals are designed and implemented to generate these products. The paper
asserts that while we still have insufficient information on the media strategies of the
Islamic State, due to the ideological, operational and network-to-network continuity
between the two organizations, the documents shedding a light on Al-Qa'ida's press efforts
can serve as valuable resources in understanding present-day (and maybe the future of)
jihadi media as well.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss2/
4

Hankiss: Behind the Scenes of Al-Qa`ida’s Media Strategy

Introduction
After analyzing the networks behind the brutal terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Europe in recent years, it seems conclusive that the guidelines
published in jihadi media, in these cases, tools for psychological warfare
aimed at disseminating fear and confusing counterterrorist efforts—relayed to
the target audience via planned media messages and social platforms.1 At this
time, however, it is challenging to uncover the strategic purposes and tactical
considerations underlying the media activity of the Islamic State. That is why,
even though they are from a period preceding the declaration of the Islamic
State, the 17 emails found during the raid on Osama bin Laden’s house in
Abbottabad—and later made available for research purposes by the West
Point Counter Terrorism Center (CTC)— invaluable source material. The
letters, written partly by bin Laden, partly by various al-Qaida leaders to bin
Laden, offer unique insight into the inner world of al-Qaida, as well as the
media plans and thought processes of its leadership. This paper intends to
provide a detailed analysis of these documents and assert that the ideological
and network-to-network continuity between al-Qaida and the Islamic State
renders analyzing the media strategies of the former a fruitful endeavor
towards understanding the present-day media practices of the latter.
A different set of documents from Iraq, also made public through the West
Point CTC Harmony Program, provide further interesting details on these
strategic considerations and media control operations. While these files
originate from the decade after 9/11, they may—based on ideological and
strategic continuity between such organizations—serve as a foundation for
revealing the propaganda machine and soft underbelly of today’s highly active
terrorist groups as well. Daniel Milton’s work on the media efforts of the
Islamic State likewise “attempts to examine declassified documents captured
from the group’s predecessors to provide a baseline understanding of its
present-day media structure and operations.”2
As the following section will discuss, there is a vast body of evidence indicating
strong ties between al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Such an example for a
bridge between past and present could be al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who frequently appears in the aforementioned documents: He called for the
latest jihad against the US and Europe in May 2018. The diversifying process
following the Islamic State’s loss of territories and influence may lead to an
amalgamation of the remaining al-Qaida and Islamic State forces. There are
alternative theories that this may occur under the leadership of Hamza bin
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Laden, as al-Zawahiri has been considered a traitor and rejected as a leader by
many. As to why al-Qaida members and leaders are suspicious of al-Zawahiri,
Ali Soufan mentions a rather enigmatic episode of his life in his book,
Anatomy of Terror. Soufan reveals the complexity of networks and spheres of
interest at play: At the end of 1996, al-Zawahiri, a veteran of the Afghan jihad,
who had also fought alongside both bin Laden and Sheikh Rahman, traveled
to Azerbaijan. From there, he entered Russia in a small van, carrying 6400
USD, accompanied by two operatives of the local cell of his organization (the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and a Chechen fixer. They pretended to be merchants,
but since they had no personal documents, the Russian security services
stopped them. He was sentenced to six months, but he was released after five
with time served. He returned to Afghanistan and managed to contact the
members of the Chechen jihad. There is no further information regarding any
potential breakthroughs that the Russian services may have had with him, and
the court's leniency remains likewise unexplained. The relevant facts may be
hidden somewhere in Russian documents.3

Continuity Between al-Qaida and the Islamic State
While this may not be common knowledge, the perpetrators of the recent
European attacks had complex personal relations with major European alQaida figures who provided them with considerable ideological and logistical
support. While the majority of these attacks are attributed to the Islamic State,
many of the assailants often collaborated on preparing these atrocities with alQaida members. The perpetrators of the Paris and Brussels attacks with the
strongest ties to veteran al-Qaida fighters, ideologists, and recruiters also
played a key role in the Francophone network of the Islamic State. Such
connections, sometimes spanning as long as decades, are also identifiable in
the case of radical cells and communities in Germany and the UK.4
Following are a few typical examples. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the ringleader of
the European attacks; Najim Laachroui, architect and bomb maker of the
Paris massacre and suicide bomber of the Brussels Airport; as well as Chakib
Akrouh, the Saint-Denis suicide bomber, had all been in close contact with
Khalid Zerkani, a radical veteran of the Afghan jihad long before the Paris and
Brussels assaults. Members of Zerkani’s cell had met each other in al-Qaida
training camps in Afghanistan and the group’s operative cells in North Africa.
After they participated in terrorist attacks in 1999 and the early 2000s, they
had a significant role – one and a half decades later – in radicalizing and
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recruiting a generation with strong ties to the Islamic State – the generation of
the Paris and Brussels terrorists, for instance. Zerkani used Turkish human
traffickers to transport foreign fighters to Syria, for which he was arrested in
February 2014. The Molenbeek district in Brussels also hosted Fatima
Aberkan, who joined the jihadi movement in 2007. She operated a recruiting
and travel network until her 2015 arrest. Within the network, she was known
as “the Mother of Jihad.” Her brother was convicted in 2003 for participating
in the assassination of Iraqi military leader Massoud. Salah Abdeslam – the
logistics coordinator of the Paris attacks – had family ties to the Aberkan
family.
Another person of interest with Moroccan background, Molenbeek resident
Gelel Attar from Zerkani’s circle, travelled to Syria with Akrouh in 2012 (for
the first time). The main suspect of the thwarted 2016 Paris attack, Reda
Kriket, financier of the Zerkani cell, also had strong ties to Akrouh and
Abaaoud. Yoni Patrick Mayne, also from Zerkani’s network, travelled to Syria
in January 2014 with Abaaoud. Charlie Hebdo attacker Cherif Kouachi and
Amedy Coulibaly, the perpetrator of a deadly assault on a Paris supermarket,
were collaborating with al-Qaida Salim Benghalem, the other ringleader of the
European attacks, on the preparations for breaking a jihadi extremist out of
prison as early as 2010 – years before the terrorist attacks in Paris.
In 2011, the two accompanied Benghalem to Yemen, where they served beside
al-Qaida commander Anwar al-Awlaki. Kouachi and Coulibaly were also
preparing for an operation with Djamel Beghal, who had been one of the key
figures of al-Qaida in Europe as well as the organization’s contact person to
fundamentalist groups in Britain from 1997. He was also responsible for the
2001 attack against the US Embassy in Paris. (Together with 450 other
radicals, Beghal will be released from French prisons by 2019.5)
In Aleppo, Salim Benghalem tortured and executed Western prisoners with
Mehdi Nemmouche, who attacked the Brussels Jewish Museum years later, in
May 2014. Islamist veteran Fabien Clain was arrested in 2009 for preparing
an assault on the Bataclan theatre: He may have been responsible for choosing
it as a target six years later. Fabian Clain worked together with Abaaoud at the
external operations command in Raqqa. Yet another example for these
overlapping networks is one of the perpetrators and organizers of the 2017
Barcelona attacks, Abdelbaki Es Satty, who established close contact with
Moroccan al-Qaida fighter Rachid Aglif, one of the 2004 Madrid train
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bombers, in prison in 2012, and stayed in Belgium (in Molenbeek) for months
in 2016.6
These overlapping networks and ties between al-Qaida and the Islamic State
survived the infighting and differences in character between the two
organizations. Similarly, in a recent presentation, Brian Fishman proposed,
“starting the clock” on the Islamic State in October 2006 instead of the more
commonly cited 2014.7 The continuity is also noticeable in the structural
similarities between the networks of al-Qaida and the Islamic State, while –
for example – the international network run by Carlos in the 1970s and 80s
from Budapest shows marked differences from both.8

Behind the Scenes: Al-Qaida Media Strategies
There is a wealth of studies enumerating jihadi media forums, analyzing the
text and visual content of various jihadi media platforms (such as Inspire,
Dabiq, or Rumijah) and discussing their goals (such as propaganda,
recruitment, intimidation, or training). Meanwhile, we know significantly less
about the process, concept, and internal logic of planning and creating that
media. Daniel Milton’s observation about this discourse, that it “mainly relies
on what the group creates for external publication” and it “has been unable to
answer questions regarding the structure, policies, and management of the
group’s media arm,”9 rings just as true for the media efforts of al-Qaida as it
does for those of the Islamic State.
The endeavor to uncover such al-Qaida media strategies found valuable – if
not entirely exhaustive – resources in the documents discovered in bin
Laden’s Abbottabad safe house. These letters have undergone primary
analysis at the hands of West Point CTC experts – from aspects different from
the one that this study will attempt to present. Their work resulted in papers
such as Liam Collins’s discussion of bin Laden’s security measures10 or a
comprehensive study by N. Lahoud et al. of the letters in terms of how they
illustrate the conflicts between bin Laden and the regional al-Qaida branches
and the leadership’s attitude towards the events of the Arab Spring.11 Their
observations also bear relevance to the analysis of media strategies. Yet
examining the letters through this particular lens may shed further light on alQaida media operations.
It is clear that bin Laden wanted centralized media above all: Not only because
he saw a coherent and authentic media strategy as a key weapon in the fight
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against the West, but also because he thought that keeping all branches of the
media in one hand might help rein in the splinter groups that were fighting on
their own. As Lahoud et al. point out,
“Bin Laden was not even inspired by Inspire, AQAP’s [al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula] English-language magazine designed to appeal to
Muslim Americans to launch random attacks in the United States (...)
In view of the recent marketing of ‘lone wolf’ operations as ‘New Age’
jihad, bin Laden instead urged methodical planning of suicide
operations.”12
Naturally, the integration of media strategy into the greater scheme of political
strategy restricts the options for practical and tactical considerations. In a
letter to “Shaykh Mahmoud” (Atiyyah Abd Al-Rahman), bin Laden presents
the main directives as “expanding the programmed and directed media, and
our efforts in directing the nation’s research and deciding on a specific plan
that we all discuss.” He notes that:
“the oncoming stage is important and very dangerous and does not
tolerate the apparent differences in our directives, [adding,] due to our
efforts in plugging that gap and preparing a plan to guide the nation,
we must mobilize all the resources that have expressive abilities in
speech, poetry, visual, or audio and devote them completely toward
directing and guiding the nation’s youth.”13
Another letter, written to AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi (or “Abu Basir”) by
an unidentified author (according to the CTC, the most likely candidates are
Osama bin Laden and/or Atiyyah), uses a rather vivid metaphor to summarize
its strategic concept:
“The enemy can also be described as a wicked tree. The trunk of that
tree is 50cm wide. The tree has many branches, which vary in length
and size. The trunk of the tree represents America. The branches of the
tree represent countries, like NATO members, and countries in the
Arab World. We, on the other hand, represent a person who wants to
cut down that tree. Our abilities and resources, however, are limited,
thus we cannot do the job quickly enough. The only option we are left
with is to slowly cut that tree down by using a saw….We want to saw the
trunk until the wicked tree is down. God willing, once the tree is down,
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its branches will die thereof…Their tree fell down, then its branches
died out, from South Yemen to Eastern Europe.”14
Atiyyah Abd Al-Rahman was a veteran jihadi who, while not bearing any
official rank or status, gained his influence in the organization from being a
close friend and confidant to bin Laden. He joined al-Qaida in 2007 as a
member of the Lybian Islamic Fighting Group and fielded a small, ragtag
private army in Waziristan. He was bin Laden’s main contact to various
branches, distant fighting factions and the operations center. Ten years after
9/11, bin Laden still entrusted him with choosing the operatives and their
coordinator for a planned terrorist attack on the United States, asking him to
“nominate a qualified brother to be in charge of a large operation in
America.”15 He also relied on Atiyyah in recruitment decisions, requesting “the
résumé of all the brothers who might be nominated for high administrative
positions now or in the future.”16
What is noticeable and remarkable at first sight is how the majority of these
letters – unlike the hate-filled articles and brutal videos aimed at the “general
public” – discuss, in practical and unemotional terms, the “force fields” of
effect and counter effect, and the enemy’s foreseeable response to each
planned press release. As the letter on al-Qaida strategy warns, “All public
announcements must be carefully evaluated. When issuing a public
announcement, ask the question of what sort of positive or negative impact
this announcement will generate for us?”17
Behind the spectacular and revolting scenes, the organization’s media
activity—its content, message, and tools—were meticulously and
professionally planned. To illustrate this, in a letter discussing media strategy,
American-born al-Qaida spokesperson Adam Gadahn openly and lengthily
criticizes “Shaykh Ayman” (al-Zawahiri) for a statement directed at the US,
where the Shaykh refers to Benjamin Franklin as “a previous president of
yours.” Gadahn further explains,
“We should remind that (Benjamin Franklin) was not a president, but a
‘statesman’…I do not know the source of the story, or its popularity
amongst the Americans. But such a mistake may be used to slander the
Shaykh and accuse him of talking about something he does not master
(politics).….Although plenty of the Americans may also think that
(Franklin) a president…but this mistake is not usually committed by
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those talking in politics, analyzing and discussing. It is a common
mistake among general people and not between specialists.”18
The media coordinators also paid special attention to timing these media
appearances. Bin Laden considered miscalculated propaganda timing a
mistake and a sign of amateurism. “It is extremely important to pay close
attention to timing,” an unidentified strategist wrote. “Timing is everything.
This saying has been proven to be true now and then.” 19 On one occasion, bin
Laden sharply criticized a coordinator for publishing a press communiqué
demanding the release of a jihadi prisoner incarcerated for financing
terrorism. While he agreed with the content, he considered the timing
counterproductive: As the issuing of the press communiqué coincided with the
Gaza flotilla raid, it had the potential for distracting readers from the
Palestinian operation against Israel.

Al-Qaida’s Efforts to Create a Centralized Media
In 2002, the first issue of the Characteristics of Jihad Magazine is published.
Al-Zawahiri sets the tone in his introduction. “This magazine is being
published during a time when there is a worldwide conspiracy against Jihad,”
he writes. The first issue covers three main areas of interest: Religious topics,
the proper rituals surrounding suicide bombings, and questions of morality
and behavior. The magazine is accompanied by a cover letter, in which the
author, the editor-in-chief of the quarterly, expresses his hopes that the
recipient, Abu-Muhammad will write the editorial and support the publication
both financially and content-wise. He requests, “the names of the authors so
that we may use the same names in future articles.”20 It is clear, however, that
the editor doubts his own judgement regarding the articles and – probably
wary of the consequences of a possible mistake – suggests setting up a
censorship body, a “religious committee” of sorts. The strategic purposes of
launching the magazine are also clearly defined: “Regarding the platform of
the group,” the editor explains, “until now and as far as we know, the group
has no clear platform through which it can be recognized by the people.”21 He
adds that:
“there is no consensus with regards the [group’s] publications; on the
contrary, there is much criticism of those publications. We need a clear
platform that communicates to the people the group’s positions with
regards to belief and ideology. We need this platform so that the
members of the group may agree on rules that everyone must follow, or
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at least rules that can be adopted by the group….Had we heeded their
call then, we would have been close to completing this task by now. I’d
like to remind [you] of something that I have mentioned in the past:
even if it is a long-term goal, working to establish a religious committee
is a very important matter that helps us avoid becoming victims of an
individual’s changes in opinions. In order to avoid any disagreement, it
is possible to have Islamic scholars review any platform we write.”22
In 2006, however, the practice of such improvised solutions and individual
projects came to a halt. In autumn, al-Zarqawi and the leadership of AQI (AlQaida in Iraq) established a center supervising all media activities, the AlFurqan Institute for Media Production, which miraculously survived every
reorganization and diversification effort, and eventually even produced
propaganda material – including execution and beheading videos – for the
Islamic State. Abu Muhammad al-Furqan became the first minister of
information and a key media coordinator for the IS until he was killed by an
air raid on 7 September 2016 in Raqqa.
From 2006, the Institute was hard at work on setting up an operational
model. “It has to be said that media has a big effect on managing a war, it is
one of those weapons that we cannot do without during the war against the
Crusaders,” a letter from the Al-Furqan Media asserts.23 “Nowadays, everyone
is aware of the media importance, so in order not to repeat the same mistakes
of the past, we have decided to set up this structure to institute a media
process in the state,” boasts a March 2007 document, which the author,
supposedly mesmerized by organized propaganda, introduced with a poem
about the importance of media (unfortunately missing from the English
translation).24
This great enthusiasm also shows in how, under the umbrella of centralized
coordination, a bout of diversification commences: Publishers, magazines,
and websites proliferate at an unprecedented rate. In his study, Philip Seib
lists the freshly launched or refurbished media outlets.25 By 2008, al-Qaida
was running 4000 websites. The group’s production company, As-Sahab, set
up in 1988 by bin Laden, released 16 videos in 2005, 58 in 2006 and more
than 90 in 2007; all the while monitoring – not unlike a Hollywood studio –
what the audience may find appealing. The so-called “Jihad Academy” incited
fighters with images of attacks and suicide bombings. Even Al-Zarqawi made a
propaganda video of himself personally beheading US businessman Nicholas
Berg in 2004 in Iraq. The video was downloaded half a million times in a
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single day. Another online magazine, Camp of the Sword focused mainly on
training fighters, claiming that their self-study program – including
intelligence gathering and wiretapping techniques – required no boot camp
visit.

Internal Rules for Introducing Suicide Bombers
Jihadi media strategists also designed a “script” for presenting suicide
bombings. Formally, they suggest that “the will reading should be about 5-7
minutes long” and that “the uniform should be black clothes and there should
be no background and they should have plenty of weapons beside them.” They
advise the person filming “the suicide brother” to be aware of the following:
“The chosen words relayed to our suicide brothers, whether it is advice
or similar should be kind words. But we have seen that some need
direction and we are accused of being warriors and not respecting
scholars as we think that we are highly intellectual and superior
compared to others and we have been descried by many as rude.
Regardless of whether we have been misjudged – we plead our case to
God-we are not going to question our virtuous brothers – but our duty
is not to hallow these thoughts but to concentrate on compassionate
words….When you are taking pictures of a martyr, please adhere to the
following: Pay close attention to most of the words chosen by the
martyr brothers about guardianship etc. and make sure they say good
things, but we have seen some where they are not paying attention and
they need direction because we are being accused of being mujahidin
by not honoring the leaders and we are accused of spreading religious
persecution and acting superior to the people and we are described as
alienating and described as having bad morals and no doubt
overlooking the extent of that for our injustice – May God take care of
the Complainers – we do not doubt the words of the pure brothers – we
heed them and god heeds them – our duty is not to ignore these
suspicions”
The text, although in places slightly confusing, is remarkable because—instead
of the suicide bombers, whose mental and psychological state has been
thoroughly analyzed—it provides insight into the mentality of the person
behind the bomber: The one who, despite considering the attack a sacred
mission, orders someone else to carry it out. Suicide attackers tended to be
outsiders, foreign fighters, not members of the AQI or the ISI top brass. This
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must have struck much of the target audience (of mobilize Muslims) as
dishonorable and thus forced jihadi media to rhetorically challenge the widely
held belief that their leaders consider themselves superior and heartlessly
send suicide bombers to their death.
Another document presents an entire “scenario” of recommendations: Specific
content to be included in the videos introducing the suicide bombers (each
point complemented with the phrase “May God rest his soul”). The
recommended talking points include questions such as “Introductions to his
life—May God rest his soul—his upbringings and mentions of his quality. The
beginning of his Jihad where and when?” or “How did he organize the attack
group before and after the fall of the regime?” and “The pledge to Sheik
Usama and how did you announce it.”26
On 10 December 2009, there was a session of the High Command for Jihad
and Liberation Media and Recruitment Department with representatives from
various governorates’ “media platoons.” The “top secret” minutes of the longwinded, meticulous committee meeting provide detailed insight into the flow
of conversation. The attendees took their time to mull over issues such as
media work related security measures, risks of using email and mobile, or the
details of work coordination. Their primary mission was clarified by a
comment from Deputy Commander Doctor Kamal al-Din al-Naqshabandi,
who asserts, “in the media field we still suffer and we still fall behind because
of media blockades imposed against us. Because of that we must build a media
base….First to official and public national media…and then worldwide media
outlets.”27

Media Campaign on the 10th Anniversary of 9/11: Centralized
Media at Work
Some letters found in Abbottabad deserve particularly thorough analysis given
that the highlighted strategic and tactical dilemmas and considerations have
far-reaching implications. In his 10 October 2010 letter to Shaykh Mahmoud,
bin Laden outlines his ideas concerning the anniversary. His observations and
suggestions are answered a few months later in a letter to an unknown
recipient by California-born al-Qaida spokesman Adam Gadahn.
“We need to benefit from this event and get our messages to the Muslims and
celebrate the victory that they achieved,” bin Laden observes about the
political goal of the campaign. “We need to restore their confidence in their
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nation and motivate them. We should also present our just cause to the world,
especially to the European people.”28 In his analysis, the timing of the
propaganda is fortuitous with regard to the grand scheme of politics. “Anyone
who looks at the enemies in NATO, especially America, will know that they are
in big trouble,” he observes.
“This year has been the worst year for them in Afghanistan since they
invaded it. The number of their dead has never been this high
according to their own reports. Their financial crisis continues. Britain
has lowered i[t]s defense budget and America is reducing the budget of
the Pentagon. Anyone who knows the world and knows politics, knows
that it is impossible for them to continue with the war. There is no
difference between them and the Soviet Union before it withdrew from
Afghanistan.”29
Yet, it is Adam Gadahn who transforms bin Laden’s concept of the campaign
into strategy and elaborates the details. “As for the benefit of exposing the
Shaykh at this stage, we should look at this matter from all angles,” he
emphasizes, since bin Laden has not made a large-scale media appearance for
almost ten years at this point.30 Gadahn finds “the 10th anniversary of the
attacks of Manhattan and Washington” (or, as he also calls it, the “Manhattan
battle”) a suitable occasion.
“Every exposure of him,” he adds, “as long as it is not daily or semiweekly, should have an influence. The repetition of his exposure,
irrespective of the vicious campaign that is waged against al-Qaida,
everywhere, is by itself something that attracts attention.”31
He also believes that the timing is especially suitable, because the US is
preoccupied with economic hardships. As he points out,
“[at] the press conference held by Obama after the midterm elections,
all the questions were on the bad economy, and the means to get out of
the crisis. Nevertheless, not one of the journalists dared to embarrass
Obama by questioning him about the influence on the American budget
and the national economy of spending the billions yearly on the two
wars of Afghanistan and Iraq.”32
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Finding Channels and Contacts for al-Qaida’s Messages
In his letter, bin Laden also wonders which forums and channels would be
suitable for broadcasting the planned al-Qaida media appearances. He seeks
suggestions and explains his selection criteria.
“We should also look for an American channel that can be close to
being unbiased,” he writes, “such as CBS, or other channel that has
political motives that make it interested in broadcasting the point of
view of al-Mujahidin.”
He also suggests enlisting the journalists, some of whom are reliable
supporters of al-Qaida, noting that the recipient
“should write to ‘Abd-al-Bari ‘Atwan and Robert Fisk and tell them that
the tenth anniversary is coming and it is the harvest of a fierce war
between al-Mujahidin and America. This is a chance to explain our
motives for continuing the war….Tell them that we suggest that they
make a documentary on this anniversary and we will provide them with
printed, audio, and video materials.” Bin Laden’s peculiar connection to
these journalists becomes clear when he advises his followers to “have
them give us their video material and the names of specialists that they
will use in order for us to establish a vision for the film and to be able to
clarify the events.”
In response to bin Laden’s proposition, Gadahn asserts that there is no real
difference between American television channels and other media outlets in
terms of professionalism or bias. Nevertheless, he reviews the options. He
excludes Fox News as the least professional and most biased broadcaster,
writing, “let her die in her anger.” He believes that although CNN closely
cooperates with the government, the Arabic version of the channel provides
detailed reporting with faithful quotations. He complains about less biased
MSNBC firing its two journalists for controversial statements. “ABC channel is
all right,” he writes, “actually it could be one of the best channels, as far as we
are concerned.” They – especially terrorism specialist Brian Ross – are
interested in al-Qaida, and they are proud of their interviews that they had
made with the Shaykh. “It also broadcasted excerpts from a speech of mine on
the fourth anniversary,” Gadahn adds, “It also published most of that text on
its site on the internet.”
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Gadahn believes that the media department should distribute the material “to
more than one channel, so that there will be healthy competition between the
channels in broadcasting the material.” His suggestions for the distribution
method may also serve as a model for al-Qaida’s general media strategy. He
proposes that they send the material to 30-50 writers, experts, and
independent journalists from various countries who are interested in al-Qaida
and compiles the lengthy list of names. He, too, puts Robert Fisk at the head
of the list.
“We would inform each,” he explains, “that he has been chosen to be
amongst a group of international journalists and writers, and that they
will receive special media material on the tenth anniversary of
9/11.….There would be a password and a site address to download the
materials at the right time, let it be 5 days before the anniversary, for
example. This is easy -as I think- on our brothers working in the
networking.”
According to Gadahn, even if only one-third of the journalists show interest,
“we would have 10 international journalists that will display our mission in
the newspapers and channels. If the experiment works,” he adds, “then I
suggest to repeat it on every important occasion.”

Target Groups for the Campaign Messages
Gadahn also specifies the target groups of the media campaign. He places
special emphasis on the European nations, just as bin Laden did in his earlier
messages. The media department would also like to address the entire Muslim
world. The key strategic goal of shaking up and igniting the Muslim countries
would soon be accomplished in the chaotic revolutions of the Arab Spring.
Jihadi forums, however, present Gadahn with an almost insurmountable
problem, rendering winning the hearts of people – one of his key endeavors—
a tough nut. Most of the Muslims find these forums “repulsive” or
inaccessible. He believes that they “distort the face of al-Qaida, due to what
you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the participants
in these forums.”
Gadahn mentions a third target group. “We should also not forget the
Mujahidin brothers in the fronts,” he writes, “who are passing through crucial
times and facing disaster after disaster.” They, however, should be addressed

72
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 2

through video messages, because “many people do not read, and even if they
read, they are more influenced by visuals.”
Visuality is also strongly featured in the documents from Iraq; for instance, in
the above-mentioned minutes of the secret the Media and Recruitment
Department meeting, where the participants instructed all their commanders:
“to document every Jihadist operations and said that it is unacceptable
to the Supreme Commander to not take quality photographs of
operations. And that a photographed operation is equal to 100
operations that were not photographed.”
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a common tactical element in hybrid
warfare. Yet, in our modern era of “grey zones,” the “enemy of my enemy”
mechanism is no longer a safe point of reference in the intricate global system
of asymmetric warfare. The virtual front lines move around quickly, alliances
are malleable, and the geopolitical actors are connected to each other through
a multiplicity of hidden agendas. Even though this method of waging war is
usually attributed to states or secret services, al-Qaida—and probably the
leadership of the Islamic State, too—have evidently been using it in a
conscious and efficient way.
Gadahn, for example, was preoccupied with the hostility between Jews and
Christians or the antagonism of Catholics and Protestants as a friction on
which subversive and recruiting activities could be built. He viewed Middle
Eastern Christians and Catholics in general as a susceptible group who may be
opposed to Jews and Protestants enough to be more open to Islam. Therefore,
he criticized the attack on the Baghdad Catholic church, claiming that it “does
not help us convey the message.” This, on the other hand, was difficult for
their own fighters and ideologists to accept. Gadahn struck a chord that may
have mitigated the expected outrage:
“How beautiful what Shaykh Usama mentioned lately -when talking
about a media speech- that the strong statements that were mentioned
by the ancestors were said during days of dignity and control, and
therefore it is not fitting to the era of vulnerability….So it cannot be
implemented on the days of weakness like our present days.”
He mentioned destroying churches and “devious religious books” as an
example. Yet he also felt right to discuss – probably because he could sense
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the weakness of his argument—“the animosity of the Pope and other church
heads to Islam and Muslims.” 33 When al-Qaida leaders fantasize about the
possibility of an alliance with Catholics against Jews and Protestants, they are
unaware of their limitations—probably due to their lack of knowledge
regarding the Jewish-Christian roots of European culture and—largely—to
their arrogance.

Conclusion
In his study on al-Qaida’s media efforts, Philip Seib asserts, “Al-Qaeda has
become a significant player in global politics largely because it has developed a
sophisticated media strategy.”34 This body of research is intended as an
analysis of that sophisticated media strategy and tactical planning, which has,
in my view, received less scientific attention lately than the media products
themselves. As the resources may have indicated, observing the way of
thinking revealed by these documents could—especially considering the
ideological and network-to-network continuity between jihadi terrorist
organizations – provide valuable pointers for analysing present-day jihadi
propaganda and the psychological warfare waged through media practices.
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